# Reverse-engineering Online Tracking

From niche research field to easy-to-use tool


Steven Englehardt









Source: Mayer & Mitchell; Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology



#### **Evercookies**







Respawn cookies using alternative locations

Flash cookies, HTML5 localStorage, ETags, etc.

#### If you're going to track me, please use cookies

Ed Felten
July 7th, 2009
freedom-to-tinker.com



# Panopiciek How Unique — and Trackable — Is Your Browser?


Is your browser configuration rare or unique? If so, web sites may be able to track you, even if you limit or disable cookies.

Panopticlick tests your browser to see how unique it is based on the **information** it will share with sites it visits. Click below and you will be given a uniqueness score, letting you see how easily identifiable you might be as you surf the web.

Only anonymous data will be collected by this site.



# **Canvas Fingerprinting**




If you're going to track me, please use cookies

If you're going to track me, please use cookies

# 2010

If you're going to track me, please use browser storage













ABOUT THE FTC

**NEWS & EVENTS** 

ENFORCEMENT

**POLICY** 

TIPS & ADV

News & Events » Events Calendar » Cross-Device Tracking



NOV 16, 2015

#### **CONSTITUTION CENTER**

400 7th St SW, Washington, DC 20024 I Directions & Nearby

TAGS: Burgary of Consumer Protection | Consumer Protection | Advertising and Marketing |

If you're going to track me, please use cookies

# 2010

If you're going to track me, please use browser storage

If you're going to track me, please use cookies

2010

If you're going to track me, please use browser storage

2015


If you're going to track me, please limit it to one device

If you're going to track me, please limit it to one device

# 2020

If you're going to track me, please \_\_\_\_\_?

Measurement can help!



### Web measurement hurdles

1. Engineering Debt

	Targets	Inf	Infrastructure		Vari	able	
			Instrumentation	pe	ğ	g 100	
		Automation	tat	Crowd-sourced Distributed	Location User-agent Demographics	l o	
		tio	eni	on on on	ent	Ja E	
		ma	E n	pidi.	age	est o	1
		1to	str	ow	er-er-	eriva	Scale
Paper		Aı	Ţ	ČÖ.	Location User-agent Demograph	Interests Privacy Tools	Sc
Leakage of PII via OSN ('09) [31]	PII leaks	M*	LHH				
Privacy diffusion on the web (709) 30	Tracking: cookies	F,PS	Proxy				1.2K s
Challenges in measuring ('10) 25	Personalization: ads		Proxy	- 1		•	730 qu
Flash cookies and privacy ('10) 53	Tracking: cookies, LSOs	M*					100 s
Privacy leakage in mOSN ('10) 32	PII leaks	M*	Proxy				
Flash cookies and privacy II ('11) 10	Tracking: cookies, LSOs	M*					100 s
Privacy leakage vs. protection measures ('11) 29	PII leaks	M*	Proxy				10 si
Respawn HTTP Cookies ('11) 41	Tracking: cookies, LSOs	UA*		- 1	•		600 s
Self-help tools ('11) 38	Tracking: cookies	UA*	FourthParty			•	500 s
Where everybody knows your username ('11) 39	PII leaks	M*	FourthParty			,	185 s
Detecting and defending ('12) [52]	Tracking: cookies	FF, TT	TrackingTracker				2K s
Detecting price and search discrimination ('12) 42	Price discrimination	SA, CH, IE, JS	Proxy	•	• • •	•	200 s
Mac users steered to pricier hotels ('12) 37	Personalization: steering				•		Valla 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Measuring the effectiveness of privacy tools ('12) 11	Personalization: ads	F, SL				•	
Websites vary prices ('12) 57	Personalization: prices, deals	6		- 1	•		
What they do with what they know ('12) 60	Personalization: ads		Proxy				10 d
AdReveal ('13) 34	Personalization: ads		Proxy, Ghostery		•		103K
Cookieless monster ('13) 47	Tracking: fingerprinting		0,1111111111111111111111111111111111111				10K :
Crowd-assisted search ('13) 43	Price discrimination	F, CH	Custom plugin				600 s
Discrimination in online ad delivery ('13) 54	Ads	M, UA			• •		2184 n
FPDetective ('13) 7	Tracking: fingerprinting, JS	CR, SL, CJ, PJ I	Proxy, Browser Cod	le			1M s
Know your personalization ('13) 35	Personalization: search		Custom plugin	•	•	,	5K qu
Measuring personalization of web search ('13) 26	Personalization: search	PJ	,	•	•		120 qu
Who knows what about me? ('13) [36]	PII leaks	F, PS, SL		•			1.5K
Selling off privacy at auction ('13) 49	Cookie sync, bid prices	F, SL			•	•	5K s
Shining the floodlights ('13) [19]	Tracking: cookies, JS	F, JS	FourthParty		•		500 s
Statistical approach ('13) 22	General tracking	F, PY	FourthParty			•	2K s
Adscape ('14) 13	Personalization: ads	F, SL	Custom plugin			,	10K s
Bobble ('14) 61	Personalization: search	CH, SL	Custom plugin	• •	• •		1K qu
Information flow experiments ('14) 56	Personalization: ads	F, SL	Proxy				1
Third-party OSN applications ('14) 14	PII leaks	F, SL	FourthParty			,	997 a
Price discrimination and steering ('14) 27	Price disc, steering	PJ	-J	•		•	16 si
	Price discrimination	CJ					21 d

<sup>=</sup> Live HTTP Headers, Asterisk = inferred

#### Many Studies, Many Platforms

- Automation:
  - 7 used Selenium (Full browser)
  - 4 used PhantomJS/CapsperJS (Headless webkit)
- Instrumentation
  - 5 used FourthParty
  - 9 used a Proxy

#### Many Studies, Many Platforms

- Automation:
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FourthParty is the only shared code


### Web measurement hurdles

1. Engineering Debt

2. Lasting Impact

# Canvas Fingerprinting in May 2014


- Acar, et.al (2014)
- 5% of Top 100k



The Web Never Forgets: Persistent Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild. Acar, et.al.

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
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## Canvas Fingerprinting in October 2015

Over 100 first-party domains on the Top 100k




# Overcoming these hurdles:


1. A Common Platform


2. A Web Privacy Census














## **OpenWPM**

- Supports browsing with persistent state
  - Browser keeps profile through crashes and freezes.
- Real Browser
  - Extensions
  - Privacy Features
  - WebRTC, Audio, Video, WebGL
- Stable

## **A Web Privacy Census**

Monthly

1 Million Site Crawl

### **A Web Privacy Census**

# Monthly 1 Million Site Crawl

Collecting:

- Javascript Calls
- All javascript files
- HTTP Requests and Responses
- Storage (cookies, Flash, etc)

## **Targeted Crawls**

Туре	Use
Stateful	<ul> <li>ID Cookies</li> <li>Respawning</li> <li>Syncing</li> </ul>
Stateless	<ul><li>Ghostery</li><li>AdBlock Plus</li><li>HTTPS Everywhere</li></ul>

### A Web Privacy Census

- 1. Measure how effective tools are
- 2. Quickly deploy new measurements
- 3. Release data and analysis monthly


## Detecting WebRTC Local IP Sniffing

#### 1. I saw a tweet that nytimes.com is IP sniffing





WebRTC being used now by embedded 3rd party on nytimes.com to report visitors' local IP addresses.



#### 2. I added code to JS Instrumentation for next crawl

#### 3. I wrote some analysis code

- Grab all urls that execute
  - mozRTCPeerConnection.onicecandidate
  - mozRTCPeerConnection.createDataChannel
  - mozRTCPeerConnection.createOffer

Check JS Files to confirm

- 4. Results (October 2015)
- 121 first-party sites
  - o 29 in the top 10k
- 24 unique scripts
- Only 1 of which is blocked by EasyList/EasyPrivacy

#### With regular measurement we can:

- 1. Inform the public
- 2. Build block lists
- 3. Change the incentives

## 2020

If you're going to track me, \_\_\_\_\_

## 2020

If you're going to track me, \_\_\_\_I'll know!

### Help us make the web more private!

- Contribute?
  - github.com/citp/OpenWPM
- Collaborate?
  - webtap.princeton.edu